

Euro-Skepticism: an issue-based approach

Daniilo Di Mauro

*Marie Curie Fellow
Robert Shuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
Florence, Italy.*

Abstract

Euro-skepticism represents the other face of the coin within the European institutional evolution and integration. In recent years, skepticism toward European institutions has transcended the support for small extremist parties starting to show manifest mass opposition (i.e. referenda, low voting turnout, etc.). Disengagement and opposition toward Europe hurt the core of the whole European political system affecting legitimacy and democratic quality. As a result, a growing number of scholars focus their analyses on the causes of Euro-skepticism both in terms of public opinion attitudes and party system. *Which are the causes of people opposition toward EU?*

The present paper addresses this question by looking whether Euro-skepticism is related to public opinion orientations toward the most salient issues, both at national and European level. Starting from the assumption that public opinion attitudes toward European institutions do not exclusively come from a cost/benefit calculation, it is possible to hypothesize that contingent political issues affects support and skepticism. Attitude formation toward EU occurs in a multilevel system where actors are limited (see Anderson, 1998) and concerned about problems that implies judgments and orientations toward national and European policies. Immigration, security, economic situation, environment are some of the main issues on which national and European institutions are judged, implying specific and general orientations. According to this perspective, drawing the links between attitudes toward those issues and skepticism, will provide a theoretical contribute about the causes of opposition to European institutions, by showing whether skepticism is dependent from the political agenda.

The paper starts from a discussion about the concept of skepticism and its operationalization. After defining the subject of the research, it will focus on the formulation of the research's hypotheses by presenting the theoretical framework. Finally, preliminary results will be showed by using different categorical models.

Since the publication of Taggard's masterpiece 'A Touchstone of dissent' (1998), the term Euro-skepticism had a growing fortune, spanning from the analysis of party systems to public opinion and electoral studies. Euro-skepticism has been largely used to describe parties' opposition toward European integration and European Union as a whole. At the same time, the concept started to be used to define public feelings and attitudes of aversion toward EU institutions. Particularly, during the 1990s, the wide debate about the EU democratic deficit gave to the concept of Euro-skepticism a great centrality in describing the gap between citizens and EU institutions.

Within public opinion studies, the fortune of the debate about Euro-skepticism created a scientific paradox. Nowadays there is a huge literature on the causes of Euro-skeptic attitudes, but the concept has neither a unique definition with clear boundaries nor a unique way to be operationalized. As a result, different theories and analytical models often compete to each other to explain a concept, called in the same way, but often substantially different.

This situation shows that the conceptualization of negative attitudes toward the EU (i.e. Euro-skepticism) and the causes of them are part of the same theoretical and analytical problem.

Gabel (1998) argues that there are at least five different theoretical approaches explaining public skepticism toward Europe. Broadly speaking, the first one - often defined as the cost/benefits or utilitarian argument - claims that people orientations toward the EU integration is the result of rational costs and benefits calculations about their states' membership (Gabel, 1998; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993 Marks and Steenbergen, 2004). According to this perspective, the European integration has, above all, economic implications that affect in different ways the citizens' interests. As a result, people judge the EU integration on the basis of the possible gains coming from it, and depending on their objective and perceived socio-economic situation. An opposite theoretical approach is represented by the two Inglehart's explanations of cognitive mobilization and post-materialist values. Both of them transcend the individual interests, highlighting the importance of information, general attitudes toward politics and the individual values resulting from the phase of socialization. According to the cognitive mobilization approach, people with a high level of political awareness and communication - i.e. cognitive mobilization - are more likely to identify themselves with a supranational political community (Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif, 1991; Janssen, 1991). In McLaren's words 'those who are capable of digesting complex political events and who actually take the time to do so are likely to be less fearful of the EU simply as a result of more exposure to it' (McLaren, 2007, p. 234). According to Inglehart, cognitive mobilization is not the only reason for support toward European integration. Other causes are related to the individual system of values regarding economic and political issues. Those values may be distinguished in 'materialist' and 'post-materialist', depending on the prominence given to material benefits or to intellectual fulfillments. Since European Union represents, in Inglehart's opinion, a challenge to nationalism and a model of egalitarianism, post-materialist are in favor of EU integration.

In contrast to this view many scholars opted for a "domestic politics" explanation. According to it, because of the low level of information and complexity of European politics, citizens use 'proxies' in their evaluations (Anderson, 1998; Franklin et al., 1994). As a result their attitudes toward integration are affected mainly by the national governments' performance (Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren, 1994; Franklin, van der Eijk, and Marsh, 1995; Anderson, 1998). Moreover, proxies' effects are not only limited to the

attitudinal sphere but, like studies on referenda and European elections showed, they influence also citizens' voting behavior. Other scholars put identity and perceived threats to their national culture at the core of their explanation of negative attitudes toward EU integration. They argue that antipathy toward the EU is due to a feeling of fear and hostility toward other cultures (McClaren, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2004). According to this view European integration is perceived as a threat to national identity and undermines the integrity of the nation-states.

Although the existence of this variegated set of explanatory approaches, the effects of the issues on negative attitudes toward Europe are clearly underestimated. Public opinion on political issues showed to deal with participation and attitudes toward political authorities. Issues and problems have been proven to affect citizens' vote and, sometimes be decisive in election victory (Tuckel and Tejera, 1983; Brody and Sniderman, 1977; Franklin et al., 1992; Blais et al., 2002; Miller and Klobucar, 2003). On the contrary, its effects on public opposition towards EU institutions are almost unexplored.

Attitude formation toward EU occurs in a multilevel system where actors are limited (Anderson, 1998) and concerned about problems that implies judgments and orientations toward national and European policies. Immigration, security, economic situation, environment are some of the main issues on which national and European institutions are judged, implying also general orientation on the whole political system. *Do public opinions on different issues affect attitudes toward Europe?*

The present paper aims to answer to this question by showing to what extent attitudes on issues affect support for Europe. The first paragraph presents a framework of support for Europe and its relation with political issues. In the second paragraph I describe the data and the selection of the variables. Finally, I report the results for three different issues -economic crisis, environment, and welfare - on three main dimensions of specific support.

Beyond Euro-skepticism: issues and support for Europe

In this process of growing importance within the debate on European politics and democratic quality, Euro-skepticism lost its conceptual boundaries. It climbed the ladder of abstraction starting to describe something beyond its original application. It became the main concept to describe the whole set of attitudes (opinion, reactions, opposition etc.) and participatory acts (protest,

votes etc.) contrary to a stronger EU integration, but also to the European policies and institutions as a whole.

In recent years some authors started a countertrend initiative to define more properly the concept, and to describe its main elements. Taggard and Szczerbiak (2001, 2004) distinguished between *hard* and *soft* Euro-skepticism, making difference between an 'outright rejection' of European integration versus a 'contingent' refusal. Following a similar path, Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) distinguishes between political and instrumental Euro-skepticism. The first type concerns adverse public attitudes (skepticism) based on the nature of each issues taken into account. Particularly, the two authors distinguish between traditional states' policies and internationalized policies. As a result, political skepticism is referred to the decision-making level: people support the EU when it deals with internationalized policies, while they are more skeptics on decisions concerning the states' traditional competences. Instrumental Euro-skepticism, on the contrary, measures opinion about the perceived benefits coming from the country membership. Lubbers and Scheepers have the merit to put the accent on the presence of different issues at different level of governance. On the other hand, their conceptualization of the types of skepticism shows problems similar to the Taggard and Szczerbiak's one (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002): it, indeed, has weak arguments in showing the distinctions between the two types and driving clear conceptual boundaries between them. Instead of a real typology their concepts represent two aspects of skepticism toward Europe: they defines two targets (policies and EU membership) of EU attitudes and not two real types of skepticism.

Recent contributes offer a new theoretical approach by outclassing the concept of Euro-skepticism and substituting it with the concept of *support* (Fuchs et al., 2010; Fuchs, 2007; 2011). Those authors move their arguments from the Easton's conceptualization of support, and its sub-types, trying to focus their analysis beyond the debate on European integration. According to the Webster definition Easton claims that 'support (is) upholding something by aid, countenance or adherence; the active promotion of the interests or cause of an object; defending something as valid, right, just or authoritative; or giving it assistance. It has a behavioral dimension and an attitudinal one because 'person is unlikely to support another in the senses mentioned here unless at the same time he is favorably disposed towards him' (p. 436). As a result, support implies evaluation (positive), orientations and attitudes before factual behavior. The opposite concept is *opposition* defined as 'resistance or dissent, expressed in action or argument' (New Oxford American Dictionary).

Negative judgment, or opposition, overlaps in part the meaning of skepticism. However, the term, more than a negative evaluation implies a distance of the judicator from the judged or opposition to an ongoing process. It better fits the analysis of sentiments toward European integration or public judgments of people not completely involved in a political system, while has a limited power in describing negative attitudes toward policies and political systems as a whole. As a matter of fact, the use of the term/concept *skepticism* in describing public opinion toward established authorities within nation states is very limited or absent. When the analysis aims to go beyond the ongoing process of European integration and focus on the relation between European authority and EU citizens, it is necessary to use a more powerful concept able to represent general and specific attitudes toward the authority. At the same time support cannot be used directly in empirical analysis since its operationalization needs lower degrees of abstraction. A high number of theoretical and empirical contributions show that there are different types of support affecting in different ways the political authorities. In Easton's words:

'Typically, members of a political system may find themselves opposed to the political authorities, disquieted by their policies, dissatisfied with their conditions of life and, where they have the opportunity, prepared to throw the incumbents out of office. At times such conditions may lead to fundamental political or social change. Yet at other times, in spite of widespread discontent, there appears to be little loss of confidence in the regime - the underlying order of political life - or of identification with the political community. Political discontent is not always, or even usually, the signal for basic political change' (p. 436).

Easton (1975) distinguishes, both theoretically and empirically, between *specific* and *diffuse* support. Specific support is an attitude (or a behavior) produced by the evaluation of the "authorities" actions. Starting from their personal beliefs, preferences, interests (etc.), people evaluate the way the authorities act. Easton uses a broad concept of authority including not only the government but also a large set of political representative offices¹. In order to produce specific support in a political system, people must be able to identify political authorities, associate their demands to authorities and feel that they can affect authorities' performances. Easton distinguishes between two kinds of evaluation: *ad hoc* and *general*. In the first type, public opinion evaluates authorities according to the extent to which they met their demands. The second type, on the contrary, concerns the general performances and is not necessarily linked to specific activities (i.e. policies). It is important to note that even if the second type implies a general

¹ At page 437 he defined the authorities as 'those who are responsible to the day-to-day actions taken in the name of a political system'.

evaluation we are still in the bulk of specific support: 'the support is still of a specific kind since its extension or withdrawal is contingent on the authorities' presumed behavior' (p. 439).

Diffuse support, on the contrary, does not concern the evaluation of performances but of the system as a whole. In Easton's words 'what an object is or represents not what it does' (p. 444). As a result, diffuse support is more durable and concerns the existence of the political system as a whole. According to Easton, it has two main sources: socialization (both in the childhood and adult phases) and direct experience.

In Easton's approach, diffuse support should be operationalized through other two concepts: trust and legitimacy. He stressed the high level of indeterminacy of this concept pointing out the necessity to descend the ladder of abstraction. By citing Gamson (1968) trust was defined as 'the probability [...] that the political system (or some part of it) will produce preferred outcomes even if left untended. In other words, it is the probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group doing anything to bring them about. They or others may do things to influence this probability [..]' (p. 447).

Legitimacy is a different and complementary concept: 'it is the conviction that it is right and proper to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime. It reflects the fact that in some vague or explicit way [a person] sees these objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere' (Easton 1965, p. 278).

According to the Easton conceptualization, Figure 1 shows the sub-types of diffuse and specific support towards European Union. The aim is to descend the ladder of abstraction and to operationalize citizens' support for the EU. Diffuse support consists essentially in the two concepts of trust and legitimacy. A deeper analysis of those concepts is far beyond the purposes of this inquiry, because a huge literature addresses their definitions and theoretical implications (among others see Beetham, 1998). Trust is usually directly operationalized, while legitimacy may still be distinguished by a dimension of values/belief and supra-nationalism. Specific support has three main components at different levels of generality. The first element is support for EU in general terms. It describes citizens' attitudes for the general performance of EU authorities, and should be distinguished from diffuse support (see Easton, 1975 p. 439). General specific support does not directly relate to specific policies but to the overall performance. On the contrary, the other two components refer to the specific policies made by EU institutions. The first dimension, Europeanization, concerns the support for the treatment

of a specific policy at the EU level. It is measured by the desire that decision-making goes beyond the local and national level, and Europe acquires a more powerful role. The second dimension measures the judgments of the EU performance on a specific policy. It represents the last level of evaluation and the most specific one.

| | |
|---------------------|--|
| DIFFUSE SUPPORT | LEGITIMACY |
| | VALUES SUPRANATIONALISM |
| SPECIFIC SUPPORT | TRUST GENERALIZED |
| | POLICY ORIENTED EFFECTIVENESS EUROPEANIZATION |

Figure1. Dimensions of Support.

Once support is defined and its components are specified from the highest level of abstraction, involving values and beliefs, to the lowest concerning policies' performances, opinions about single issues acquire a bigger theoretical space among the causal effects of support for Europe.

Perceptions of issues and opinions about them should result in such a way related to the evaluation of the performance. Moreover, since people use proxies to judge the performance, issues may also affect support at a more general level.

The first hypothesis is that the way people perceive an issue, and give it importance among the political priorities, affects the level of specific support. In this sense, rather than the nature of the issue (international or traditionally national), it is necessary to define the importance of an issue both at social and personal level. The level of importance, or saliency, is not the only dimension of commitment to a specific political problem. Another aspect is what I call "concern" for a particular issue. Concern overlaps only in part with saliency because the two implies a feeling of commitment toward an issue. However, saliency has a more general sense even if referred to the personal beliefs, because imply an overall declaration of priorities. Concern, on the contrary can be interpreted as a personal sentiment of fear on a more contingent scenario. We expect that both saliency and concern over an issue

influence the level of specific general support and, more strongly, the support of the performance and Europeanization for each issue. Theoretically, two sub conditions should be added to this hypothesis. First, problems and issues must go beyond the personal sphere. They should be perceived as problems of the community and, for this reason, to be solved by it. Concern has a political effect when people move from a personal perception of a problem to a political one: 'a personal problem is likely to affect a political choice only if the voter feels the government has a responsibility to help. And the chief reason most personal problems have little impact on the vote is because of the pervasiveness of the view that people ought to cope with their problems on their own' (Brody and Sniderman, 1977). Second, problems become politicized when 'citizens hold government responsible for helping them cope with the problems they face' (Brody and Sniderman, 1977).

The second hypothesis is that perceptions of political issues and opinions about them have a weak effect on diffuse support. According to Easton's arguments trust and legitimacy are only in part dependent from the contingent scenario and the issues at stake in a particular moment. They represent sentiments linked to the socialization phase and to personal beliefs and values about the rules governing the system and its institutions as a whole.

Saliency and concern about the issues will be not the only variables observed into the models. Their influence will be compared to the effects of other indicators present in different theoretical approaches and to socio-demographic variables.

Data selection

Eurobarometer 71.3 from Summer 2009 was selected for the present analysis, since it contains the most comprehensive set of questions about issues and support for Europe. According to the definition of support and its types, it is necessary to have direct questions for each issue/policy taken into account. This is particularly true for the two components of specific support defined as performance evaluation and Europeanization. General support and all the dimensions of diffuse support, on the contrary, do not need indicators for every single issue. Another important restriction is represented by the two main independent variables, saliency and concern, because they must have an indicator for every single issue. Considering all of those criteria three

issues have been selected for the analysis: economic crisis, environment and welfare state.

The selection of a dataset that was not created ad hoc for the analysis generates some compromises, even using a long and comprehensive database like the Eurobarometer. In this case some dimensions of diffuse support were lost for the absence of specific questions. As a result, the analysis of the effects of the independent variables on diffuse support will be limited to the degree of trust for the EU institutions². General support for the EU has been tested through a question largely used by the literature on public attitudes toward European integration³. Request for the Europeanization of the three policies, and the judgments of EU performances on them, have been measured through specific and direct questions. Control variables comprehend "classics" socio-demographic characteristics like age, education, class self-positioning, and position on the left-right scale. The two main independent variables have been operationalized through specific questions measuring the saliency for each issues and the level of concern. In this case people were asked how they see the current situation on the specific policy. Along with those two independent variables the models included also some other indicators considered by the theoretical approaches briefly discussed above as key aspects in explaining the support for Europe. They comprehend European identity, nationalism (or national identity), sense of efficacy, image of Europe and post-materialist values. The justifications related to the use of those variables in predicting support for the EU, and integration, has been largely discussed in the literature. For this reason, a further argumentation would result in a repetition, perhaps not exhaustive, of well-known arguments (Gabel, 1998; McLaren, 2002, 2004, 2007; Hooghe and Marks, 2002, 2007 etc.). However, I will dedicate more attention on them and make a comparison with previous findings by commenting the results. Unfortunately other variables that may have a key effect on the degree of support, like the level of information, are not available in the Eurobarometer dataset⁴. Appendix 1 comprehends the complete list of the questions used and the recoding procedure.

² For the complete list of questions and the coding procedure see the Appendix.

³ There is clear controversy about the type of support represented by this variable. Some authors used it as a dimension of diffuse support while others considered it as an indicator of the specific one. According to the framework of analysis, I decided to adopt the second option. The evaluation of the membership's effect could not be considered as an aspect of trust and/or legitimacy, but represents a general evaluation of the European system's performance not directly mentioning specific policies.

⁴ A measure of information was deducted from the question concerning Council's presidency: "In the European Union, each Member State, in turn, becomes the President of the Council of the European Union for six months. Right now, it's the turn of Czech Republic. Have you recently read in the newspapers or heard on the radio or television or seen on Internet anything about Czech's presidency?". When not reported, results show not significant coefficients.

The following paragraphs report the results of different multilevel models for each issue and dependent variables. They presents essentially four analysis in which the effect of the independent variables have been tested respectively for the three kinds of specific support – performance evaluation, Europeanization and general specific support - and for the trust on European institutions.

Results

Support on European Performance

Table 1 shows the results of the multilevel analysis on the performance evaluation for each issue. Since evaluation of European performance is measured on a 1 to 10 point scale – where the lowest value means ‘not at all satisfactory’ and the highest means ‘very satisfactory’ – positive coefficients indicate a positive relation with dissatisfaction while negative coefficients mean the opposite. European sense of identity shows significant negative coefficients for all the three questions. However, it was coded from the highest sense of identity to the weakest ones. As a result, the more is the sense of European identity the more is satisfaction with each single policy performance. The same is evident from Efficacy and positive image of the European Union. Both of them have a positive relation with the performance evaluation, showing once again that an overall affection to European institution and a sense of influence affect the judgments on the single policies. Results about trust in national government are consistent to the existing literature on this field: people tend to negatively evaluate single performances when distrust their own government (Franklin et al., 1994). Something different, on the contrary, appears from national identity. In this case, only the coefficient about economy is significant while the other two issues show not significant result. National identity, in countertrend with other authors’ findings (Mclaren, 2002; 2007) does not affect the judgments on policies’ performances⁵. Dummy variables on occupation do not clearly show the links between economic labor condition and performance evaluation. First of all, coefficients related to the environmental issue are not significant except for the self-employed category. But the most unexpected result is that both the categories traditionally perceiving the treats from Europe (i.e. manual workers and/or unemployed) and the self-employed have negative coefficients.

⁵ These results are different from the findings of other researches. It is important to mention, however, that not all the analyses addressing this problem use the same indicators.

Age, economic self-placement and gender have significant coefficients for all the three issues. Age has a negative relation, while self perception of the personal economic situation is positively related: the more an individual perceive itself at a higher point in the social scale the more s/he likes the performance. Males have more probability to give positive evaluations but with differences between economy and the other two issues. Education is significant only for the environmental performance and, surprisingly, it is negative: the more people are educated the more they are likely to be dissatisfied. Finally the last two variables concern the first hypothesis made in the previous paragraph. Saliency does not confirm the hypothesis. Both in its individual and social dimension, the level of saliency of an issue do not predict the evaluation of the European performance on that issue. Only the individual saliency on welfare is significant and, as expected, negative. On the contrary, public concerns about the current situation on each issue under analysis show significant results. They are negatively related to the level of satisfaction with the performance such that pessimism toward the current situation in each issue is more likely to generate dissatisfaction for the EU performance.

| European Performance | | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | Economic grow | Environment | Welfare |
| Identity | -.1973354 .02*** | -.1796668 .02*** | -.1928439 .02*** |
| Efficacy | .5293656 .03*** | .4371592 .03*** | .4926352 .03*** |
| Trust in Nat. Gov. | .405703 .03*** | .2109437 .03*** | .3969032 .03*** |
| Postmaterialism | .1332393 .02*** | .0306554 .03 | .1053861 .03*** |
| Nationalism | .0713764 .03** | .0004535 .03 | -.0040743 .03 |
| Left-Right | .026484 .01*** | .0297117 .01*** | .0397821 .01*** |
| Image | .7685601 .03*** | .6399656 .03*** | .7148428 .03*** |
| Unemployed | -.3181137 .06*** | -.1148692 .07 | -.3097148 .07*** |
| Retired | -.0817066 .06 | -.1082701 .07 | -.160626 .06* |
| Self-employed | -.262223 .07*** | -.2445074 .07** | -.1938796 .07** |
| Employed | -.1257917 .05* | -.0901051 .05 | -.1698384 .05** |
| Manual worker | -.1611708 | -.0580643 | -.1622823 |

| | .06** | .06 | .06** |
|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Age | -.0052931 .00*** | -.0049508 .00*** | -.0065577 .00*** |
| Economic selfplacement | .1026463 .01*** | .0669785 .01*** | .0983884 .01*** |
| Education | .0236874 .02 | -.110341 .02*** | -.0512441 .02* |
| Male | .1572008 .02*** | .0808561 .03** | .0704627 .03* |
| Saliency (personal) | -.0159874 .03 | | -.086076 .04* |
| Saliency (sociotropic) | -.0254033 .03 | | .0066937 .05 |
| Concern on economy | -.4862289 .06*** | | |
| Concern on Environment | | -.8016342 .04*** | |
| Concern on Welfare | | | -.3963647 .06*** |
| cons | 4.144769 .13*** | 5.630762 .15*** | 4.505555 .14*** |
| COUNTRY: Independent | | | |
| | Estimate | SE | |
| sd(crisis_) | .2405248 | .049138 | |
| sd(_cons) | .3518417 | .0555409 | |
| sd(Residual) | 1.811233 | .0097701 | |
| sd(env_) | .1678025 | .0458917 | |
| sd(_cons) | .5324986 | .0742936 | |
| sd(Residual) | 1.922716 | .0103779 | |
| sd(welfare_) | .2401287 | .050261 | |
| sd(_cons) | .406884 | .0587588 | |
| sd(Residual) | 1.858062 | .0101676 | |

Table 1. Multilevel Analysis: European performance.

Support for Europeanization

Support for Europeanization in every single issue was coded as a dummy variable where 1 means 'more decision making at European level' and 0 the remaining categories of 'less decision making at European level' and 'no change is needed'. The effects of the independent variables observed in the analysis on European performance have been estimate through a multilevel

model. Multilevel analysis shows different results for the relation between Europeanization and the independent variables in every issue investigated. Those results are less easily interpretable and only partially confirm the hypothesis made on Europeanization for each issue.

Like in the previous models, European identity and efficacy have significant coefficients for all the three issues. Also in this case the relation is positive, since the probability to prefer a strong decision-making at European level is higher for people feeling more European and having a stronger sense of efficacy. The positive image of Europe shows the same results, having significant coefficient and a positive relation to Europeanization. Except for those three variables and *age*, all the other predictors show different level of significance for the issues under analysis. Trust for national government has no effect on the desiderated level of Europeanization in the three issues, along with self-economic placement, education, gender (male) and three of the five indicators distinguishing the occupational situation (unemployed, retired, manual worker). Left and right self-placement has significant coefficients for environment and welfare with a negative sign. As a result, the Europeanization of those policies is more likely to be supported by electors of the left side. Post-materialist values are significantly related to Europeanization only for the environmental issue, while Nationalism has a significant coefficient only for welfare.

Looking at each single issue, the results appear quite intuitive except for economy. The Europeanization level of the welfare state is affected by the sense of national identity and is less likely that people having a higher level of rights (like self-employed and employed) want a stronger Europeanization. Also the effect of post-materialism on the environmental issue was expected since environmental protection traditionally require a supranational decision making level. On the contrary, support for Europeanization on economy shows some unexpected result: the absence of a utilitarian component. Different occupational positions show, in this case, all positive and not significant coefficients. In addition, also economic self-placement confirms the fact that whatever is the socio-economic position of interviewed it does not affect the desiderated level of Europeanization in economic matters. Finally, the results of trust in national government and national identity (except for welfare) contrast with the literature on European integration that used similar dependent variables. Those authors, on the contrary, showed and stressed the resistances due to nationalistic sentiments and distrust toward national government (McLaren, 2007; Franklin et al. 1994). The difference, in my view,

is that the request for a stronger EU role, when analyzed for each issue, is not always affected by nationalism.

| Europeanization | Economic grow | Environment | Welfare |
|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Identity | -.2886684 .02*** | -.3329879 .03*** | -.2712032 .02*** |
| Efficacy | .4272727 .05*** | .3253307 .05*** | .3886495 .04*** |
| Trust in Nat. Gov. | .0759903 .05 | .0624029 .05 | -.0544803 .04 |
| Postmaterialism | -.06875 .04 | .1019368 .04* | .0122957 .04 |
| Nationalism | .0309061 .03 | .0309079 .04 | .1029743 .03** |
| Left-Right | -.0056514 .01 | -.035405 .01*** | -.0297355 .01*** |
| Image | .5421272 .04*** | .4821665 .05*** | .4675891 .04*** |
| Unemployed | .0514587 .09 | -.0648885 .10 | -.0823054 .09 |
| Retired | .0340142 .09 | -.1057589 .09 | -.1238725 .08 |
| Self-employed | .0238322 .09 | -.055641 .10 | -.2267134 .09* |
| Employed | .0433708 .07 | -.0343719 .08 | -.1832775 .07** |
| Manual worker | .1179815 .08 | .1084765 .09 | -.0073187 .08 |
| Age | -.0082751 .00*** | -.0037134 .00* | -.007291 .00*** |
| Economic selfplacement | .0109188 .01 | -.007152 .01 | -.002266 .01 |
| Education | -.0388233 .03 | .0437564 .03 | -.005698 .03 |
| Male | -.0479069 .04 | -.0195719 .04 | -.0044469 .04 |
| Saliency (personal) | .039835 .05 | | .1030176 .05* |
| Saliency (sociotropic) | .1767009 .04*** | | -.0302205 .07 |
| Concern on economy | .0726349 .08 | | |
| Concern on Environment | | .2769299 | |

| | | | |
|--------------------|----------|----------|-----------|
| | | .05*** | |
| Concern on Welfare | | | -.0651447 |
| | | | .05 |
| cons | 1.750048 | 2.054662 | 1.720991 |
| | .19*** | .20*** | .19*** |

Table 2. Multilevel Analysis: Europeanization.

The tests of the hypothesis made in the first paragraph show puzzling results. The hypothesis that both the level of saliency and concern on an issue affect the request for a stronger EU intervention on that issue is only partially verified. Socio-tropic saliency is significant for economy and positively related to it, while personal saliency is significant for welfare. Concern is significant only for the environmental issue: the more is the concern for the environment the more is the likelihood to agree for a stronger Europeanization of the issue. The other two issues do not show a significant effect of concern, bringing to reject – at least in part - the hypothesis made on Europeanization. Authors that operationalized Europeanization in a unique index independently from each issue may argue that this is not a surprising result (see McLaren, 2002; Gabel 1995, 1998). According to their analyses, Europeanization is a comprehensive sentiment, independent from the issues: in choosing for a higher level of Europeanization, people do not consider each issue but express an overall desire. This hypothesis is also confirmed by a factor analysis (FA) that I made on the entire set of questions about Europeanization. All the 13 different issues have the highest factor loadings on a single factor (table 3). As a result both saliency and concern have not significant coefficients in some issues. At the same time, factor analysis does not explain why concern on environment and saliency have significant coefficients. Factor analysis may demonstrate that a battery of questions loan on the same factor, and for this reason, that the questions can be reduced to one index. However, FA does not exclude that independent variables have different influences in each of the questions on Europeanization.

(obs=22972)

Factor analysis/correlation
 Method: principal factors
 Rotation: (unrotated)

Number of obs = 22972
 Retained factors = 5
 Number of params = 55

| Factor | Eigenvalue | Difference | Proportion | Cumulative |
|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Factor 1 | 5.73097 | 5.09354 | 0.9539 | 0.9539 |
| Factor 2 | 0.63743 | 0.34781 | 0.1061 | 1.0600 |
| Factor 3 | 0.28962 | 0.12475 | 0.0482 | 1.1083 |
| Factor 4 | 0.16487 | 0.15793 | 0.0274 | 1.1357 |
| Factor 5 | 0.00694 | 0.02635 | 0.0012 | 1.1369 |
| Factor 6 | -0.01942 | 0.03443 | -0.0032 | 1.1336 |
| Factor 7 | -0.05384 | 0.02522 | -0.0090 | 1.1247 |
| Factor 8 | -0.07906 | 0.02072 | -0.0132 | 1.1115 |
| Factor 9 | -0.09978 | 0.01258 | -0.0166 | 1.0949 |
| Factor 10 | -0.11236 | 0.02148 | -0.0187 | 1.0762 |
| Factor 11 | -0.13385 | 0.01988 | -0.0223 | 1.0539 |
| Factor 12 | -0.15373 | 0.01639 | -0.0256 | 1.0283 |
| Factor 13 | -0.17011 | . | -0.0283 | 1.0000 |

LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(78) = 1.4e+05$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

| Variable | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 | Factor 4 | Factor 5 | Uniqueness |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|------------|
| QA16_1 | 0.6111 | 0.3995 | -0.0895 | 0.0696 | 0.0032 | 0.4541 |
| QA16_2 | 0.6451 | 0.3694 | -0.0872 | 0.0821 | 0.0122 | 0.4330 |
| QA16_3 | 0.6727 | 0.2448 | -0.1265 | 0.0483 | -0.0098 | 0.4691 |
| QA16_4 | 0.6956 | -0.1434 | -0.2865 | -0.1241 | -0.0016 | 0.3981 |
| QA16_5 | 0.6749 | -0.2734 | -0.2558 | -0.0938 | 0.0033 | 0.3955 |
| QA16_6 | 0.6852 | 0.0689 | 0.1393 | -0.1420 | -0.0329 | 0.4851 |
| QA16_7 | 0.6925 | -0.0263 | 0.1530 | -0.1321 | -0.0277 | 0.4781 |
| QA16_8 | 0.6899 | 0.0342 | 0.1512 | -0.1154 | 0.0311 | 0.4857 |
| QA16_9 | 0.6592 | -0.0444 | 0.1557 | -0.0416 | 0.0498 | 0.5350 |
| QA16_10 | 0.6036 | 0.1113 | 0.1140 | 0.0171 | -0.0104 | 0.6099 |
| QA16_11 | 0.6695 | -0.2552 | 0.0183 | 0.1232 | 0.0193 | 0.4708 |
| QA16_12 | 0.6535 | -0.2787 | 0.0484 | 0.1908 | -0.0060 | 0.4565 |
| QA16_13 | 0.6711 | -0.1495 | 0.0699 | 0.1490 | -0.0292 | 0.4993 |

Table 3. Factor Analysis: Europeanization for all the issues.

Another hypothesis is that the willing to have a stronger EU intervention in each policy could interact with other opinions and specifically with the belief that a stronger EU role may better solve the problem. Although an indicator of this kind is not present in the dataset for the welfare issue, I found an appropriate variable for the economic one. This question asks which actor is the best one to solve the economic crisis. The variable has been recoded into two indicators where respectively the value 1 was assigned to the choice of 'national government' and 'European union'. Other categories were coded as 0. A multilevel model shows that the inclusion of the two interactions with the concern for economy makes different results. Although concern for crisis has still no significant effect, its interactions both with nation-state and Europe as best actor to solve the crisis, have opposite and significant coefficient. Those who are concerned about economy and thinking that the nation state is the best actor to face the crisis are more likely to contrast an Europeanization of economy. On the contrary, those concerned about the crisis and thinking that Europe Union could solve it are more likely to choose for a stronger role of the EU in economy (table 4).

Mixed-effects logistic regression
Group variable: COUNTRY

Number of obs = 15728
Number of groups = 29

Obs per group: min = 172
avg = 542.3
max = 800

Integration points = 7
Log likelihood = -7655.6408

Wald chi2(21) = 734.59
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

| econeurop | Coef. | Std. Err. | z | P> z | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|--------------------------|-----------|-----------|--------|-------|----------------------|
| identity | -.2702454 | .0260892 | -10.36 | 0.000 | -.3213793 -.2191115 |
| eff1 | .4111083 | .0471488 | 8.72 | 0.000 | .3186984 .5035182 |
| postmateri~m | -.0520692 | .0422261 | -1.23 | 0.218 | -.1348309 .0306924 |
| nationalism | .0169375 | .0390619 | 0.43 | 0.665 | -.0596224 .0934974 |
| ideology | -.0036729 | .0093714 | -0.39 | 0.695 | -.0220406 .0146947 |
| image | .5408124 | .0464066 | 11.65 | 0.000 | .4498572 .6317677 |
| unemployed | .0177875 | .0971866 | 0.18 | 0.855 | -.1726949 .2082698 |
| retired | .0260989 | .092124 | 0.28 | 0.777 | -.1544607 .2066585 |
| selfempl | .0104971 | .0997725 | 0.11 | 0.916 | -.1850533 .2060476 |
| employed | .0606247 | .0758287 | 0.80 | 0.424 | -.0879968 .2092462 |
| manualwork | .0777393 | .0891685 | 0.87 | 0.383 | -.0970277 .2525063 |
| age | -.008058 | .0017224 | -4.68 | 0.000 | -.0114339 -.0046822 |
| selfpla | .0200909 | .0141736 | 1.42 | 0.156 | -.0076888 .0478707 |
| edu | -.0589768 | .0337811 | -1.75 | 0.081 | -.1251865 .0072329 |
| male | -.015377 | .0421366 | -0.36 | 0.715 | -.0979632 .0672092 |
| pers_ec | .0299684 | .0478387 | 0.63 | 0.531 | -.0637938 .1237306 |
| socio_ec | .156815 | .043095 | 3.64 | 0.000 | .0723504 .2412796 |
| info | -.0671073 | .0450084 | -1.49 | 0.136 | -.155322 .0211075 |
| crisis_ | .0644668 | .0752332 | 0.86 | 0.392 | -.0829876 .2119211 |
| c.crisis_# c.capableu | .2531437 | .0597056 | 4.24 | 0.000 | .1361229 .3701644 |
| c.crisis_# c.capable | -.3969933 | .0693713 | -5.72 | 0.000 | -.5329586 -.2610281 |
| _cons | 1.778774 | .1934045 | 9.20 | 0.000 | 1.399708 2.157839 |

| Random effects Parameters | Estimate | Std. Err. | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|---------------------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|
| COUNTRY: Independent | | | |
| sd(crisis_) | .2374734 | .0846405 | .1180942 .4775306 |
| sd(_cons) | .4734813 | .075469 | .3464403 .6471088 |

LR test vs. logistic regression: chi2(2) = 483.82 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Table 4. Multilevel analysis: Europeanization on economic issue.

General Support for the European Union

Results on general support for the EU (table 5) concern the main indicator used in the literature to explaining support for integration. It is represented by the level of benefit coming from the country membership in the EU. It was coded as a dummy variable where the value 1 was assigned to those who said that their country benefited from the membership and 0 to those thinking the opposite. The multilevel model shows consistent results to previous analyses and some interesting differences.

European identity and efficacy are once again positively and significantly related to the level of support. The first variable, in the last two decades,

have attracted the attention of many analysts. A huge amount of scientific contributes focus on various aspect of EU identity like its definition and evolution (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Risse, 2004) its centrality in the European polity (Trenz and Wilde, 2009, Risse, 2010) and the factors increasing the European citizens sense of belonging (Green, 2007). Investigations on identity were focused on the source of it, but also on the effects of a higher sense of belonging on European politics. The results here presented are strongly coherent with those contributes. At the same time, identity is not only expected to relate to specific support but also to the diffuse type. It represents the ground of legitimacy in a political system, and for this reason it is able to affect both support for specific policies and for the system as a whole.

A counter argument concerns national identity that, like showed in previous analyses, negatively affects the level of support (Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2004). According to this approach opposition toward Europe is positively related to a high sense of national identity. Particularly, it is due to the fear that EU may treat the symbols and the substance of the nation state. People are not directly hostile to EU institutions, but rather want to protect their national identity (Carey, 2002; Llamazares and Gramach, 2007; Wessels, 2007). Protectionist attitudes towards national identity strongly influences support for the EU when national identity is perceived exclusively and in opposition to the European one (Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002, 2004, 2007; Hooghe and Marks, 2004). On the contrary when Europeans think themselves in terms of multiple overlapping identities are more likely to support for Europe.

Iteration 2: log likelihood = -7012.968

Mixed-effects logistic regression
Group variable: COUNTRY

Number of obs = 16126
Number of groups = 29
Obs per group: min = 175
avg = 556.1
max = 830

Integration points = 7
Log likelihood = -7012.968

Wald chi2(20) = 3159.49
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

| benefit | Coef. | Std. Err. | z | P> z | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-----------------|-----------|-----------|--------|-------|----------------------|
| identity | -.333788 | .0265832 | -12.56 | 0.000 | -.38589 - .281686 |
| eff1 | .9215808 | .0492801 | 18.70 | 0.000 | .8249936 1.018168 |
| trusting | .4373852 | .051335 | 8.52 | 0.000 | .3367705 .5379999 |
| postmaterialism | .1961778 | .0437752 | 4.48 | 0.000 | .1103801 .2819756 |
| nationalism | -.1379534 | .0391179 | -3.53 | 0.000 | -.2146231 -.0612837 |
| ideology | .0251396 | .0096988 | 2.59 | 0.010 | .0061304 .0441488 |
| image | 1.851137 | .0504739 | 36.68 | 0.000 | 1.75221 1.950064 |
| unemployed | -.1680669 | .0994963 | -1.69 | 0.091 | -.3630761 .0269423 |
| retired | -.1742474 | .0957152 | -1.82 | 0.069 | -.3618458 .0133509 |
| selfempl | -.0798512 | .1058274 | -0.75 | 0.451 | -.287269 .1275666 |
| employed | -.0905794 | .0792314 | -1.14 | 0.253 | -.24587 .0647112 |
| manual work | -.2949964 | .0909635 | -3.24 | 0.001 | -.4732816 -.1167112 |
| age | -.0074944 | .0018053 | -4.15 | 0.000 | -.0110327 -.0039562 |
| selfpl a | .0763011 | .0148646 | 5.13 | 0.000 | .047167 .1054351 |
| edu | .1620522 | .0351025 | 4.62 | 0.000 | .0932524 .2308519 |
| male | .1648442 | .0442084 | 3.73 | 0.000 | .0781974 .251491 |
| info | .2014089 | .0471887 | 4.27 | 0.000 | .1089208 .2938971 |
| crisis | -.1306247 | .0578378 | -2.26 | 0.024 | -.2439847 -.0172646 |
| env | -.1241311 | .0465942 | -2.66 | 0.008 | -.2154541 -.0328081 |
| welfconcern | -.2501972 | .0470941 | -5.31 | 0.000 | -.3425 .1578945 |
| _cons | .1254558 | .2240714 | 0.56 | 0.576 | -.3137161 .5646276 |

| Random effects Parameters | Estimate | Std. Err. | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|--------------------------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|
| COUNTRY: Identity sd(_cons) | .7133937 | .0967874 | .5468211 .9307077 |

LR test vs. logistic regression: $\chi^2(01) = 1021.12$ Prob>= $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

Table 5. Multilevel analysis: general support for European Union.

Trust for national government shows similar results to that ones on the evaluation of the EU performance: the more people trust their governments the more likely are to support the EU in general. These findings seem consistent to other researches showing a relationship between distrust for national government and support for European Union (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000; Kritzinger, 2003; etc.). Also Inglehart's theory is confirmed. Unfortunately, one of the most used indicators of cognitive mobilization (discuss politics) is not present in the used Eurobarometer survey. However, two indicators confirm Inglehart's conclusions. The first shows that the more the level of information the highest is the support for Europe (Inglehart, 1970; Janssen, 1991; Karp et al., 2003), while the second prove that post-materialist values increase the probability to support for the membership (Inglehart, 1970).

Like other researches testing for the effect of image of Europe, the results show that this indicator is significant and has a strong positive relation with support. Image of Europe can be considered a measure of a general latent feeling toward the EU. It should be included in the model because support could be influenced by feelings at different levels of specificity, from policy-

oriented ones to general vision of the EU. Otherwise, general feelings toward EU institution may create a bias in the findings (Mclaren, 2007). Within the model this variable is not only significant but has the highest coefficient.

Results concerning the socio economic indicators are only partially consistent with the cost/benefit approach. Occupational condition has a significant coefficient only for the category of manual workers. Particularly, manual workers are more likely to not considering the EU membership as a benefit from their countries. This finding can be explained through a cost/benefit approach by arguing that people with less-skilled occupations are afraid of the liberalization of the market and the relative increase of competition coming from a higher EU integration. Other two coefficients seem to confirm this theory. First of all, economic self-placement is positively related with support: people that feel to occupy higher positions in the social scale are more likely to support the EU. Secondly, education has a significant effect on the predicted direction: the more citizens are educated the highest is the probability to support the Union. The only contrasting element is that, albeit workers more exposed to the competition in a more liberal environment are less likely to support Europe, the opposite cannot be said. All the other occupational categories, especially those that should support the EU integration because of the gains deriving from it, have not significant results. More importantly their coefficients have negative signs, demonstrating that whatever is the occupation the relation with support remains negative.

Among socio-demographic variables, both age and education have significant coefficient although with opposite signs. Younger European citizens are more likely to support the EU as well as more educated people. Finally, all the indicators of concern for every issue show negative and significant values. As have been observed for specific-policies support, the more the public is concerned with an issue the lower is their support for EU institutions.

Discussion

The debate about public opinion attitudes toward the European Union needs to go beyond the analysis of skepticism. Euro-skepticism is a limited concept, still valid for the investigation of negative attitudes toward European integration, but not able to describe the overall sentiments toward European institutions, neither to allow the comparison to the attitudes toward the nation states. In order to reach this aim, the concept of public support and opposition – as defined by Easton and successively implemented – seem more appropriate in mapping citizens' attitudes toward European authorities.

Particularly, they represent a general framework applicable at any level of governance that includes a wide set of attitudes from specific policies to beliefs and general feelings toward authorities.

By analyzing the sources of specific support, the findings here provided show that concern for specific issues matters at different levels of inquiry. In specific-policies support for the EU action (i.e. evaluation of EU performance) all the three indicators of concern for every issue showed significant and negative coefficients. People concerned with an issue are more likely to blame European past initiatives on it. This is also the case for general specific support and partially for trust toward the EU (table 6). However in the last case, regarding diffuse support, concern has not significant coefficient for all the issues. *Why does public concern affect support for Europe at different levels?*

A large part of the literature on electoral studies demonstrated that concern and saliency of some issues affect public attitudes and voting behavior. People perceive some issues more problematic than others on the basis of its personal situation and/or beliefs about the reality of their community. The problems considered as a social matter become politicized when people concerned by them identify the authority (politicians, candidate, institutions, etc.) that should provide a solution. At this point the concern affects the attitudes toward the target authority creating a sentiment and/or a behavior of opposition. According to the findings here provided, this process has a stronger impact on specific support, since the "contingency" of concern affects the judgments on the decision-making process and the general evaluation of the authority. Otherwise, when we look at a higher level of abstraction (i.e. at the legitimacy of the system as a whole) concern has a weaker impact.

Mixed-effects logistic regression
Group variable: COUNTRY

Number of obs = 16226
Number of groups = 29

Obs per group: min = 171
avg = 559.5
max = 859

Integration points = 7
Log likelihood = -6976.7666

Wald chi2(20) = 4223.24
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

| trusteu | Coef. | Std. Err. | z | P> z | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|--------|-------|----------------------|
| identity | -.2976815 | .0279906 | -10.64 | 0.000 | -.3525421 - .2428209 |
| eff1 | .9679208 | .0478406 | 20.23 | 0.000 | .8741549 1.061687 |
| trustng | 1.730198 | .0524084 | 33.01 | 0.000 | 1.62748 1.832917 |
| postmateri~m | .0002096 | .044518 | 0.00 | 0.996 | -.0870442 .0874633 |
| nationalism | .0028608 | .0403312 | 0.07 | 0.943 | -.0761868 .0819085 |
| ideology | .0029614 | .0098151 | 0.30 | 0.763 | -.0162758 .0221986 |
| image | 2.076097 | .0471017 | 44.08 | 0.000 | 1.983779 2.168414 |
| unemployed | -.3634572 | .1007337 | -3.61 | 0.000 | -.5608916 -.1660227 |
| retired | -.3061903 | .0972936 | -3.15 | 0.002 | -.4968823 -.1154982 |
| selfempl | -.2766036 | .1044888 | -2.65 | 0.008 | -.4813979 -.0718093 |
| employed | -.3266612 | .0785042 | -4.16 | 0.000 | -.4805267 -.1727958 |
| manualwork | -.3547991 | .0913812 | -3.88 | 0.000 | -.533903 -.1756952 |
| age | -.0047726 | .0018294 | -2.61 | 0.009 | -.0083582 -.0011871 |
| selfpl | .0506224 | .015122 | 3.35 | 0.001 | .0209838 .080261 |
| edu | .063454 | .035964 | 1.76 | 0.078 | -.0070341 .1339421 |
| male | -.062908 | .0444334 | -1.42 | 0.157 | -.1499958 .0241798 |
| info | .0378357 | .0472472 | 0.80 | 0.423 | -.0547672 .1304385 |
| crisis_ | .0264516 | .0573473 | 0.46 | 0.645 | -.085947 .1388501 |
| env_ | -.184844 | .047128 | -3.92 | 0.000 | -.2772132 -.0924748 |
| welfconcern | -.1861559 | .0482567 | -3.86 | 0.000 | -.2807373 -.0915745 |
| _cons | -.6361645 | .2339346 | -2.72 | 0.007 | -1.094668 -.1776611 |

| Random effects Parameters | Estimate | Std. Err. | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|---------------------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|
| COUNTRY: Identity | | | |
| sd(_cons) | .7890776 | .1073802 | .6043457 1.030277 |

LR test vs. logistic regression: chi bar2(01) = 887.20 Prob>=chi bar2 = 0.0000

Table 6. Multilevel analysis: trust in European Union.

Results on support for Europeanization of each issues, only partially verify the hypothesis made. Among the three issues only concern about environment has a significant coefficient. Specifically, the more is the concern about the situation of the environment the higher is the support for a stronger role of Europe vis a vis the single countries. Differences among issues could be explained by the fact that concern does not always is sufficient to affect support for Europeanization. In some cases it should be linked to the belief that the target authority (in this case the European Union) is at least a better actor to solve the problem. When the two variables interact, as we have seen for economic crisis, they affect the support for Europeanization of an issue.

It is important to note that the analysis of the relation between concern and diffuse support here conducted is only preliminary and not completely exhaustive. More issues should be analyzed and the effects of concern and saliency must be observed also on the entire set of indicators of diffuse support. At the same time, it could be stressed that support for European

institutions is also the result of contingent sentiments linked to the political agenda.

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APPENDIX

- EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are...EUROPEAN

To a great extent; somewhat; not really; not at all; DK

DK recoded as missing values.

- EUROPEAN EFFICACY

Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree. My voice counts in the European Union

Coded as 1=agree 0= do not agree/DK

- TRUST FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.

The (Nationality) government

Recoded: 1= tend to trust; 0=tend to not trust; DK= missing

- POSTMATERIALISM

If the following changes to our way of life were to happen in the near future, do you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither a good nor bad thing?

Less emphasis on money and material possessions

Good=1; bad thing, neither a good nor bad thing, DK=0

- NATIONAL IDENTITY

Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are...NATIONALITY

To a great extent; somewhat; not really; not at all; DK

DK recoded as missing values.

- IMAGE OF EUROPE

In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?

Positive and fairly positive=1; neutral, fairly negative, very negative image, dk =0

- PERSONAL SALIENCY

And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing at the moment?

Economic situation; pension.

Mentioned=1; not mentioned=0

- SOCIAL SALIENCY

What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?

Economic situation; pension.

Mentioned=1; not mentioned=0

- LEFT-RIGHT

In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale?

1= LEFT to 10=right; refusal and DK= missing.

- AGE

How old are you?

- SOCIO-ECONOMIC SELF-PLACEMENT

On the following scale, step '1' corresponds to "the lowest level in the society"; step '10'

corresponds to "the highest level in the society". Could you tell me on which step you would place yourself?

- EDUCATION

How old were you when you stopped full-time education?

Recoding: less than and no full time education 15=1; between 15 and 19=2; more than 20 and still studying =3; refusal and DK=missing

- GENDER

Male=1; Female=0

- OCCUPATION

What is your current occupation?

Unemployed mentioned=1; all the others=0

Retired mentioned=1; all the others=0

All self-employed mentioned (farmer, fisherman etc.) originally from 4 to 9=1; others=0.

All employed mentioned (professional, manager, etc.) originally from 10 to 16=1; others=0.

Manual workers and unskilled workers mentioned (original categories 16 and 17) =1; others=0.

INFORMATION (PRESIDENCY)

In the European Union, each Member State, in turn, becomes the President of the Council of the European Union for six months. Right now, it's the turn of Czech Republic. Have you recently read in the newspapers or heard on the radio or television or seen on Internet anything about Czech's presidency? (M)

yes=1; no or dk=0.

- CONCERN ECONOMIC CRISIS

How would you judge the current situation in each of the following? The situation of the (NATIONALITY) economy.

Very good and rather good=1; very bad and rather bad=1; dk=missing

- CONCERN ENVIRONMENT

How would you judge the current situation in each of the following? The situation of the environment in (OUR COUNTRY)

Very good and rather good=1; very bad and rather bad=1; dk=missing

- CONCERN WELFARE STATE

For each of the following please tell me whether you think it applies to the (NATIONALITY) social welfare system? Your social welfare system... Provides wide enough coverage

Applies fairly badly=1; Applies fairly well, neither=0; DK= missing

- SPECIFIC SUPPORT-POLICY ORIENTED-EFFECTIVENESS-ECONOMY

Using a scale from 1 to 10, how would you judge the performance of the European Union in each of the following areas? '1' means that the European Union's performance in a specific area is "not at all satisfactory" and '10' means that its performance is "very satisfactory".

Ensure economic grow: 1 to 10

- ENVIRONMENT

Using a scale from 1 to 10, how would you judge the performance of the European Union in each of the following areas? '1' means that the European Union's performance in a specific area is "not at all satisfactory" and '10' means that its performance is "very satisfactory".

Protecting the environment: 1 to 10

- WELFARE

Using a scale from 1 to 10, how would you judge the performance of the European Union in each of the following areas? '1' means that the European Union's performance in a specific area is "not at all satisfactory" and '10' means that its performance is "very satisfactory".

Protecting social rights: 1 to 10

- SPECIFIC SUPPORT-SPECIFIC ORIENTED-EUROPEANIZATION

- ECONOMY

For each of the following areas, please tell me if you believe that more decision-making should take place at a European level or on the contrary that less decision-making should take place at a European level? Ensure economic grow

More decision at the EU level=1; less decision-making at the EU level =0; no change is needed and DK= missing

- ENVIRONMENT

For each of the following areas, please tell me if you believe that more decision-making should take place at a European level or on the contrary that less decision-making should take place at a European level? Protecting the environment

More decision at the EU level=1; less decision-making at the EU level =0; no change is needed and DK= missing

- WELFARE

For each of the following areas, please tell me if you believe that more decision-making should take place at a European level or on the contrary that less decision-making should take place at a European level? Protecting social rights

More decision at the EU level=1; less decision-making at the EU level =0; no change is needed and DK= missing

- GENERAL SUPPORT

Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?

Benefit=1; not benefited=0; dk=missing

- TRUST EUROPE

I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The European Union

Recoded: 1= tend to trust; 0=tend to not trust; DK= missing

- BETTER ACTOR TO CONTRAST THE ECONOMIC CRISIS:

THE (NATIONALITY) GOVERNMENT

In your opinion, which of the following is best able to take effective actions against the effects of the financial and economic crisis?

The (NATIONALITY) Government=1; other categories=0; dk and refusal=missing

- BETTER ACTOR TO CONTRAST THE ECONOMIC CRISIS:

THE EUROPEAN UNION

In your opinion, which of the following is best able to take effective actions against the effects of the financial and economic crisis?

The European Union=1; other categories=0; dk and refusal=missing