

1. THE MARKET PROBLEM

Carbon removals can under-deliver

Carbon dioxide removal is needed at very large scale, but projects differ sharply in cost, durability and risk. Forests burn; geological reservoirs can leak; institutional and technical conditions vary.

Markets still rely on labels such as 'permanent' versus 'non-permanent' and on flat buffer rules. These heuristics do not state the probability, magnitude or timing of under-delivery.

The result can be over-collateralisation of low-risk projects, under-protection against high-risk projects, and residual climate risk shifted onto society.

PROJECT OR PORTFOLIO • CONFIDENCE LEVEL α • HORIZON T • TONNES OF CO₂

How much storage could be lost in a bad-tail outcome - and how much must be buffered to make a promise safe?

2. THE MEASURE

Carbon at Risk in one line

$$\text{CaR}_{\alpha}^T = Q^T - D_{1-\alpha}^T$$

QT = contracted removals
D^T[1- α] = lower-tail quantile of realised storage at T

DOWNSIDE RISK

The shortfall that will not be exceeded with probability α .

BUFFER

Extra tonnes required to make a delivery obligation safe.

ILLUSTRATIVE 95% EXAMPLE

Q = 1,000 kg and CaR₉₅ = 397 kg.
There is a 95% chance that at least 603 kg remains stored. A 397 kg buffer therefore makes a 603 kg obligation 95%-safe.

Normalise by Q to report CaR as a percentage or kilograms per tonne contracted.

3. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT RESULTS

One scale, very different permanence risks

>70%

California forest project
95% CaR at 200 years

single project

0.15%

well-regulated offshore
storage
95% CaR at 200 years

geological storage

17%

poorly regulated onshore
storage
95% CaR at 200 years

geological storage

7 pp

reduction in 100-year California CaR from pooling
100 projects when $\rho = 0.10$

65% → 57.8%

61 + 45

DACCS + forest projects in the cheapest stylised
portfolio meeting a 30,000 t target


95% confidence

THE MEAN IS NOT ENOUGH

Two portfolios can have the same expected storage but very different probabilities of large shortfalls. Risk magnitude and correlation - not qualitative labels - determine the cost-effective mix.

FROM A DELIVERY DISTRIBUTION TO A BUFFER

CaR turns the lower tail into an operational procurement rule



1

CHOOSE THE RISK STANDARD

Specify the assessment horizon T and confidence level α .

2

ESTIMATE THE FULL DELIVERY DISTRIBUTION

Use observations, simulations or both - including the lower tail.

3

READ THE LOWER-TAIL QUANTILE

D^T[1- α] is the amount still stored in the adverse tail at horizon T.

4


SIZE THE CONTRACT AND BUFFER

Contract Q = G + CaR so the lower-tail delivery equals the obligation G.

All contracted tonnes - including the buffer - enter the delivery distribution. No "buffer on the buffer" is required.

4. FOREST CARBON

Wildfire risk accumulates through time




Monte Carlo simulations combine the 2002-2023 fire record, region-specific regrowth and a 0.5% annual climate-driven increase in burn rates.

California: CaR₉₅ ≈ 65% at 100 years and exceeds 70% at 200 years.

Slow regrowth and a skewed fire tail matter. Fitting an extreme-value tail raises the 100-year estimate by about 23%.

5. GEOLOGICAL STORAGE

“Permanent” is not a uniform risk class



0.15%

well-regulated offshore

200-year CaR₉₅

17%

poorly regulated onshore


200-year CaR₉₅

Weak regulation degrades integrity through unplugged legacy wells and incomplete well inventories. At 1,000 years, CaR₉₅ is 0.66% offshore but about 20% onshore.

Site selection and regulation are first-order determinants of risk within the same technology.

6. DIVERSIFICATION

Correlation sets a floor to risk reduction



WHAT DIVERSIFIES?

Idiosyncratic project losses can diversify. Shared climatic, regulatory or policy drivers cannot.

WHAT DOES NOT?


Diversification narrows the tail component of CaR, but leaves the contracting gap untouched.

For 100 California projects, CaR falls only from about 65% to 57.8% when pairwise correlation is 0.10.

Most gains arrive by 20-50 projects. Spreading across regions and risk drivers matters more.

7. PORTFOLIO DESIGN UNDER RISK

Risk, cost and correlation jointly determine the cheapest mix



STYLISTED PROCUREMENT EXAMPLE

Goal: at least 30,000 tCO₂ still stored after 200 years with 95% confidence.

Forest: \$40/t, risky and climate-sensitive.
DACCS: \$500/t, near-certain and regulation-sensitive.

Cheapest feasible mix: 61 DACCS + 45 forest projects;
\$16.15m; D₅ = 30,016 tCO₂.

Above forest correlation $\rho \approx 0.16$, buying more forest stops purchasing enough tail protection and the optimum becomes mixed.

A technology's portfolio value depends on what it is combined with.

8. MARKET DESIGN AND USES

What CaR changes in practice

1 BUFFER AND CREDITING

Size reserves to the measured tail rather than a conventional flat percentage.

2 INSURANCE AND RESERVES

Give actuaries a common basis for pricing reversal risk and holding capital.

3 PROCUREMENT AND PORTFOLIOS

Compare effective cost per tonne delivered and minimise cost subject to permanence.

4 DISCLOSURE AND UPDATES

State α , T, distributions and unmodelled risks; update estimates as data accumulate.

PROOF OF CONCEPT: conditional on genuine removals entering storage; some delivery, additionality, tenure and technical risks remain outside the case studies.

MEASURE THE TAIL • DISCLOSE THE ASSUMPTIONS • BUILD THE PORTFOLIO

