Egenis seminar: "The Metaphysics of Biological Essentialism"

In Biological Essentialism (2023), and earlier papers, I have argued that taxa thought to be in the Linnaean hierarchy—including, but not limited to, species—have partly intrinsic and partly historical essences. These works did not fully engage with some anti-essentialist positions, particularly those of John Dupré, which stem from a broader metaphysical view about essences. In this paper, I argue that this broader view is variously mistaken. None of the following count against essentialism: that a lot of objects should be conceived of as an individual rather than a kind; a kind’s lack of sharp boundaries; variation and change in a kind; taxonomic pluralism. Finally, contra Dupré, classification in science, including biology, is of kinds with explanatory essences that it is the business of science to investigate. The argument for my essentialist doctrine rests on the demands of biological explanation: the partly intrinsic, partly historical, essence of a taxon is “super-explanatory” of its phenotypic properties.

Venue: Byrne House, Streatham Campus, Exeter (limited spaces)

Online: via Zoom

Free to attend.Register here

Please note that if you register to attend in person and decide not to attend, please cancel your ticket as spaces are limited.